IsProjectSetupLikeNavalWarfare

Alistair Cockburn made an interesting blog post a few months back that just cross now crossed my radar.

Is Project Setup Like Naval Warfare?

It's worth a read if you've ever puzzled over how some projects seem set up to fail, but have lacked the words and distinctions to describe what you've seen.

This is one of those start-of-a-discussion pieces, so let's discuss. Based on your experiences with projects, does Cockburn's analogy have merit?

I say Yes, but then I get pulled into a lot of seemingly doomed projects that need a dose of rescue.

--DaveSmith 2006.10.15

Well, I don't really agree with the idea that "with sea battles you can tell who will win by reading the placement of the pieces at the start of the battle." I used to serve in the US Navy, and an awful lot of battles didn't go the way you'd have thought, even in 20/20 hindsight. OTOH, quite a few battles do go as one might expect. (Two examples from WWII: Leyte Gulf (especially the Battle Off Samar) for the unexpected outcome, and the Marianas Turkey Shoot for the expected one.)

That being said, I do agree (with Alistair and with Dave) that some projects are set up to fail from day one. If such a project somehow does manage to succeed, it's generally despite the established process, not because of it.
-- EdmundSchweppe 2006.10.16

I don't have the appropriate experience to comment on Cockburn's project observation, but I don't think the analogy works.

I think of Midway where the expected outcome would have been a major Japanese victory, but it didn't happen that way. If anything, naval warfare is more uncertain than land warfare due to tremendous ranges over which it is fought. As an example, the carrier Yorktown at Midway survived considerable damage during the battle only to be sunk by a submarine after the battle was won. Then again, by any account, the Yorktown should never have been at Midway having been badly damaged at the Coral Sea. The Japanese even believed she was sunk. Lady Luck, long shifts at a Pearl Harbor shipyard, and just plain Magic were needed. Worse for the software project analogy, the shipyard, when asked to repair the Yorktown in a very short time, supposedly answered, "The difficult we do immediately, the impossible takes a little longer," and then delivered.

MikeMelendez 2006.10.16

My impression when Cockburn mentioned naval battles was more along the lines of Admiral Nelson in wooden ships. Reading the Patrick O'Brien books, one gets the sense that the direction of the wind at the beginning of an engagement imposes harsh constraints on the action that follows. To me, that's a closer parallel to software projects. By the time the project appears to have been started, a lot of stuff has happened behind the scenes. There's some room for the project to manuever, but the "terrain" of organizational and policital lines, high-level expectations, staffing, and maybe even contracts, is largely fixed and establishes limits on manueverability.

--DaveSmith

I hear you, Dave. But here I think history disagrees with Cockburn again. The Napoleonic Wars were fought with technology that had been stable for a couple of centuries both at sea and on land. Indeed, I believe the popularization of the "lines of force" idea comes from Jomini who described the _land_ warfare techniques used extensively in the Napoleonic era. Many historians say Wellington was so successful at war because he could calculate those lines of force in his head, even when vastly outnumbered, see Assaye his greatest battle. The technological advances first used in the American Civil War turned all of that on its head, both on land and at sea.

I offer a variation on Cockburn's idea. Perhaps the problem isn't naval versus land warfare, but rather that all too many view software projects as warfare rather than construction. Again, I don't have the experience to make the judgement.

MikeMelendez 2006.10.17

Dave,

Alistair Cockburn: Many executives seem inclined to set them (projects) up to fail, and then intend to win by exhorting everyone to valiant effort. But even valiant effort still loses the naval battle.

Do executives unintentionally set up projects to fail?

Yes.
If Alistair is implying that the poor project set up is intentional failure, I can't buy into that idea.

Is there a pattern to these failures?

Yes, in my experience, there is.
First and foremost, the culture has a strong rule against any person informing any other person that the emperor has no clothes. And it has strong rules against saying anything about the rule. If you speak up, you will be harmed.
Second, a failure to lucidly define the project's requirements.
Third, a failure to have the project's requirements and plans reviewed by knowledgeable people.

Do executives expect valiant efforts from members of the project team?

Always.

Do executives sometimes relabel a failed project as a success?

Is the Pope Catholic?
How safe is it for the sponsoring executive to say a $100M project was a failure?

Finally, regardless of the initial position, predicting the future in an uncertain game. Knowing today's weather fronts will help a meterologist create a high probability forecast for tomorrow's weather, but it won't help s/he create an equally high probability forecast for the weather in two weeks.

SteveSmith 2006.10.17

I'm not so sure that Napoleonic naval battles were that predictable. My impression (entirely from Patrick O'Brian) is that everything is going along swimmingly for one side then there's a slight shift of breeze and kaboom.

Last year I read about Trafalgar. It seems that a major reason for Nelson's success was that he gave just a few clear orders, one of which was for his captains to use their own initiative once the battle had begun. In contrast half the combined (French/Spanish) line continued sailing away from the battle because the flagship was unable to issue orders to turn, giving the British the advantage.

Actually maybe failing to take the initiative and waiting for orders does remind me of at least one troubled project I witnessed...

-- PaulWilson 2006-10-19

If you accept Cockburn's premise and turn the idea on its head, you might say that Naval battles *start* further ahead of the shooting than land battles. The "battle" *is* all that early positioning.

- JimBullock

Jim wrote:The "battle" *is* all that early positioning.

Sun Tzu and Liddell Hart would agree with you, Jim. Though both wrote directly about land warfare.

MikeMelendez 2006.10.20

I've been mulling over the notion of "manueverability" in projects from the perspective of the "iron triangle" of

Time
People
Requirements

By the time many projects "start", expectations on time and requirements are fixed in ways that severely limit manueverability along those axis. On the people axis, management often overestimates the maneuverability they have, by thinking of people (at least for high-level planning purposes) as interchangeable units with short learning curves.

Has anyone seen plans that call for adding lots of staff "later" work out? I usually see hiring and training being a bigger drain than planned. And the influx of new ideas late in a project that's been designed up-front can be disruptive. (Sometimes that's a good thing, but it's never free.)

--DaveSmith 2006.20.21

Dave,

The iron triangle is insufficient, which is why that metaphor doesn't work. I use a pyramid-thing of 6 faces.

I have had seen plans that call for some staff later. Especially if the project had no or inadequate testers, adding professional testers provide the project way more information that previously. -- JohannaRothman 2006.10.22

How did the plans work out? Did getting more information later in the game help them stay on time or budget?

Updated: Sunday, October 22, 2006